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Justice Delayed: The Complex System of Delays in
Criminal Court
Kat Albrecht, Maria Hawilo, Thomas F. Geraghty &
Meredith Martin Rountree*
While federal and state constitutions and statutes guarantee criminal
defendants a speedy trial, in practice these rights are exceedingly difficult
to enforce. Felony criminal cases can be tied up in court for years. Defendants and victims return to court repeatedly, but progress in resolving
their cases is slow.
This Article uses unique data from Cook County, Illinois, to illuminate
a complicated and path-dependent system of delay in the Criminal Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County. Our analysis demonstrates that
delay is not only pervasive, but also central to how this criminal court
system functions.
The Article first reviews prior work on case-processing delays. Second, the Article uses theories of path dependency to explain case delay in
the Cook County criminal courts, one of the largest criminal courts in the
world. Third, the Article brings to bear three dimensions of system-wide
and nuanced observational data to describe felony case-processing delays in Cook County’s criminal courts. Fourth, the Article analyzes these
data to differentiate types of delays, demonstrate inertia in the face of
these delays, and finally, show how courts depend on delays to keep the
system running. The Article concludes by discussing strategies to eliminate specific types of delays, but underscoring how the relationships
among different court actors must change to address the problem of
* Kat Albrecht is an Assistant Professor in the Criminal Justice and Criminology Department in the
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies at Georgia State University. Maria Hawilo is a Distinguished Professor in Residence at the Loyola University Chicago School of Law. Meredith Martin
Rountree is a Senior Lecturer at Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law. Thomas
Geraghty is the Class of 1967 James B. Haddad Professor of Law and formerly the Associate Dean
for Clinical Legal Education and Director of the Bluhm Legal Clinic at Northwestern University
Pritzker School of Law. There have been countless students who have helped us conduct observations and refine methodology, and who have also provided research. We are grateful to our “Cook
County” seminar students at Northwestern Law for their rich and detailed observations of the Cook
County criminal courts, and we are also grateful to students who provided coding assistance. Amy
Smekar provided detailed and rich ethnographic observations. Brittain E. Spurka assisted with research and formatting.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On May 15, 2010, sixteen-year-old Kalief Browder was accused of
stealing a backpack.1 Charged with robbery, grand larceny, and assault,2
Browder plausibly insisted on his innocence.3 No reliable evidence or

1. Jennifer Gonnerman, Before the Law, THE NEW YORKER (Sept. 29, 2014), https://www.
newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/06/before-the-law [https://perma.cc/J57R-TLYV].
2. Id.
3. Id.
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testimony was ever produced to suggest that he had committed the crime.4
Browder would spend the next three years in New York’s Rikers Island
jail, most of the time in solitary confinement.5 One could reasonably ask
why even a guilty sixteen-year-old would ever be imprisoned at Rikers.
But this Article takes up a different question: Why was he there for three
years?
When he entered Rikers Island as a high school sophomore, Kalief
Browder joined the 85% of Rikers Island inmates who were presumed
innocent and awaiting trial.6 His was also one of 5,695 felony cases prosecuted that year by the Bronx District Attorney’s office.7 The Bronx
courts were and continue to be exceptionally backlogged, leaving thousands of presumed-innocent defendants incarcerated with little power to
influence the slow churn of the courts.8 Browder faced a system in which
defense attorneys strategically delayed their cases and prosecutors were
unprepared to move forward, all the while asserting his innocence and his
right to trial, for three years.9 At his thirty-first court appearance, on May
29, 2013, Browder was told his case was being dismissed due to lack of
evidence.10 After 961 days in Rikers Island, Kalief Browder was finally
released.11
The story ended tragically. Browder entered Rikers Island as a normal
teenager, enjoying video games and spending time with his friends.12
While incarcerated he faced violence, mistreatment, and malnutrition.13
After numerous attempts both in custody and after his release, Kalief
Browder committed suicide on June 6, 2015.14
4. Id. In the case proceedings, the victim testified inconsistently about the circumstances of the
robbery and the date it occurred. Id. Browder also offered himself up for search at the time of his
arrest, and no backpack was found on his person or among his possessions. Id.
5. Id.
6. MICHAEL REMPEL ET AL., CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, CLOSING RIKERS ISLAND: A
ROADMAP FOR REDUCING JAIL IN NEW YORK CITY 7 (2021), https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/media/document/2021/Roadmap_for_Reducing_Jail_NYC_0719202
1_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/UF29-XW4G].
7. Gonnerman, supra note 1.
8. In 2016, New York commissioned the Excellence Initiative to improve case-processing
speeds across the state, with focus on felony cases, particularly in New York City. J OANNA WEILL
ET AL., CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, FELONY CASE DELAY IN NEW YORK CITY: LESSONS FROM A
PILOT PROJECT IN BROOKLYN 1 (2021), https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/media/document/2021/Case_Delay_Policy_Brief_3.29.2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6AU-TQQM].
Despite these efforts, the average time to felony trial verdict in the Bronx in 2019 was still 708 days
(almost two calendar years). Id. at 2.
9. Gonnerman, supra note 1.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Jennifer Gonnerman, Kalief Browder, 1993–2015, THE NEW YORKER (June 7, 2015),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/kalief-browder-1993-2015 [https://perma.cc/74682SZY].
14. Id.
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While Kalief Browder’s story helped catalyze efforts to make crucial
changes to juvenile incarceration, the fact that it took New York’s criminal courts three years and thirty-one court appearances to adjudicate his
case has not prompted comparable action focused on delay in criminal
courts.15 National research demonstrates New York is hardly an outlier.
The National Center for State Courts surveyed twenty-one states and concluded that none of those states’ courts met its national timeliness standard, and the courts averaged 256 days to process a felony case.16
In this Article, we use history and recent data from one of the largest
criminal court systems in the United States, Cook County, Illinois, to examine and understand the court processes that delay felony case adjudication in Cook County.17 We find that these processes are so deeply embedded in daily court practices that they have become necessary to prop
up Cook County criminal case adjudication.
The Cook County Criminal Division is no stranger to journalistic and
15. In 2014, New York City Mayor Bill De Blasio cited Browder’s story when announcing the
ban on solitary confinement for sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds. Benjamin Weiser, Kalief
Browder’s Suicide Brought Changes to Rikers. Now It Has Led to a $3 Million Settlement, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/24/nyregion/kalief-browder-settlementlawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/W3PY-RT3E]. In 2016, United States President Barack Obama also
referenced Browder’s case in his writings on solitary confinement and his decision to ban it entirely
for juveniles and limit its use for low-level infractions. Barack Obama, Opinion, Barack Obama:
Why We Must Rethink Solitary Confinement, WASH. POST (Jan. 25, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/barack-obama-why-we-must-rethink-solitary-confinement/2016/01/25/
29a361f2-c384-11e5-8965-0607e0e265ce_story.html?utm_term=.dbc4375be5ec
[https://perma.cc/6WJ4-QWEJ]. In October 2019, Mayor De Blasio committed to closing Rikers
Island entirely by 2027. REMPEL ET AL., supra note 6, at 3.
16. BRIAN J. OSTROM ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., TIMELY JUSTICE IN CRIMINAL
CASES: WHAT THE DATA TELLS US 7–8, 13 (2020), https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/53218/Timely-Justice-in-Criminal-Cases-What-the-Data-Tells-Us.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QQ28-UQBU]. In their study Timely Justice in Criminal Cases: What the Data
Tells Us, Ostrom et al. “collected a standardized set of case-level data from 1.2 million felony and
misdemeanor cases from over 136 courts in twenty-one states” and “analyzed the data to determine
factors most directly shaping criminal case-processing time.” Id. at 3. The study provided the following national timeliness standards with respect to felony cases: 75% of such cases should be
resolved within ninety days, 90% of cases should be resolved within 180 days, and 98% of cases
should be resolved within 365 days. Id. at 4. But the study found that, on average, the courts studied
as part of this project resolved 83% of felony cases within 365 days. Id. at 6.
17. This work is an extension of the scholarly trajectory undertaken by these authors on dysfunctions in Cook County courts. The first paper in this work used rich ethnographic observations
to develop two themes that characterize courtroom culture in Cook County courts. In it we argued
that Cook County court culture is characterized by both micro-level and structural-level failures.
The former may be conceptualized as “mistakes,” while the later are systemic functioning errors.
That work makes use of legal-cynicism theory to explain how this court culture impacts the most
vulnerable. This Article significantly differs from the first in that it takes an in-depth look at caseprocessing delays using a unique triplicate of data and economic theories of path dependency to
ultimately make arguments about the normalization of felony case processing. Therefore, we position this Article as a useful addition to the world of the first but also a substantial advance its own
right. See generally Maria Hawilo et al., How Culture Impacts Courtrooms: An Empirical Study of
Alienation and Detachment in the Cook County Court System, 112 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
171 (2022).
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scholarly scrutiny regarding case delay.18 Multiple sources document
how, at least with respect to delay, plus ça change, plus c’est la même
chose. Delay has plagued the Cook County criminal courts for almost a
century.19
The 1929 Illinois Crime Survey, perhaps the most comprehensive
study of justice in Illinois ever conducted, found that continuances in
criminal cases were routinely granted without cause, frustrating the efficient and fair administration of justice.20 In 1967, a University of Chicago
Law Review article examined
the complaints of some observers that the volume of continuances
in the Cook County criminal courts is excessively high; that defendants use continuances to defeat or delay prosecution; and that
more stringent control of continuances on the part of the courts
would yield both an increase in convictions and a reduction of
costs in terms of police, witness, and court time .21
Importantly, as the authors concluded, “[c]ontinuances also entail
some sacrifice of the objective of speedy trial.”22 They noted too, that
“[d]elay is especially costly to defendants detained for long periods of
time awaiting trial,” but that these extended proceedings also produce
18. See, e.g., Laura Banfield & C. David Anderson, Continuances in the Cook County Criminal
Courts, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 259, 259 (1968) (examining effects of excessively high volume of continuances in Cook County criminal courts); CHARLES D. EDELSTEIN ET AL., BUREAU OF JUST.
ASSISTANCE, REVIEW OF THE COOK COUNTY FELONY CASE PROCESS AND ITS IMPACT ON THE
JAIL POPULATION 1 (2005) (“The objective of the review was to determine if the criminal case
process was itself contributing to jail population pressures that the Board of Commissioners was
under legal obligation to bring under control and into compliance with the terms of a Consent Decree in a long-standing case in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, known
as the Duran case, alleging unconstitutional conditions of confinement in the Cook County Jail.”).
See generally STEVE BOGIRA, COURTROOM 302: A YEAR BEHIND THE SCENES IN AN AMERICAN
CRIMINAL COURTHOUSE (2005); NICOLE GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, CROOK COUNTY: RACISM AND
INJUSTICE IN AMERICA’S LARGEST CRIMINAL COURT (2016) (detailing racial abuses and due-process violations in Cook County criminal courts). Following Van Cleve’s work, some have analyzed
the role of the United States court system itself in embodying and perpetuating a racist justice system. See, e.g., Matthew Clair & Amanda Woog, Courts and the Abolition, 110 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 4) (“Our central argument is that courts—with a focus here on the
criminal trial courts and the workgroup of actors within them—function as an unjust social institution; we should therefore work toward abolishing criminal courts and replacing them with other
institutions that do not inherently legitimate police, rely on jails and prisons, or themselves operate
as tools of racial and economic oppression.”). In this Article, we acknowledge and describe systemwide dysfunction in case processing in Cook County that has disparate impacts on individuals and
communities of color.
19. See ILL. ASS’N FOR CRIM. JUST., ILLINOIS CRIME SURVEY 216 (1929) (finding that Cook
County criminal courts frequently granted continuances in 1929). See also Banfield & Anderson,
supra note 18, at 259 (examining delays in Cook County criminal courts in 1968); DANIEL T.
COYNE, CHI. APPLESEED FUND FOR JUST., A REPORT ON CHICAGO’S FELONY COURTS 31–33
(2007), http://chicagoappleseed.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/criminal_justice_full_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J3YZ-D32M] (examining factors causing delays in Chicago’s felony courts).
20. ILL. ASS’N FOR CRIM. JUST., supra note 19, at 216.
21. Banfield & Anderson, supra note 18, at 259.
22. Id. at 262.
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costs to the larger legal system.23 In 1988, the Chief Judge of the Circuit
Court of Cook County appointed a commission to investigate the causes
and effects of a corruption scandal involving several Cook County judges
and lawyers. The commission compared the then-current situation to the
1929 Illinois Crime Survey and concluded “conditions in the criminal
branch courts . . . were almost identical . . . almost 60 years later.”24
The Chicago Reader newspaper returned to the subject in 2016, following the experience of Jermain Robinson. In the summer of 2012,
twenty-one-year-old Chicago native Jermain Robinson began what
would be a four-year journey through the Cook County courts.25 Arrested
on suspicion of having a weapon, and believing there to be no material
evidence, Robinson refused to plead guilty.26 He would spend the next
1,507 days in jail awaiting a resolution in his case.27He poignantly described going to court as going before the judge for a couple minutes or
less, only to have the judge decide the case could not move forward.
“Then it would be another continuance,’ Robinson sa[id]—and another
month or two in jail.”28 After waiting months for the arresting officer to
respond to a subpoena to appear, the judge found that there was insufficient evidence to have arrested Robinson in the first place. After over four
years of waiting, he was finally freed.29 Robinson’s experience is not so
different from thousands of other defendants in Cook County criminal
courts. In 2016, for instance, more than one thousand individuals incarcerated at Cook County Jail waited more than two years for their trials to

23. Id.
From the standpoint of retribution, speedy trial is an adjunct of the need for finality; in
order to maintain public confidence that the guilty are punished, the tension of incomplete determinations must be resolved as quickly as possible. A deterrence rationale also
requires that delay be minimized; the deterrent efficacy of criminal sanctions is presumably diluted when their application is postponed and consequently made less certain.
Even the rehabilitative ideal is best served when treatment of the offender is begun as
soon as possible after commission of the offense.
Id.
24. SPECIAL COMM’N ON ADMIN. OF JUST. IN COOK CNTY., FINAL REPORT 65–66 (1988),
https://jenner.com/system/assets/assets/SpecialCommissionAdminJusticeSolovyReport1988.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H2NJ-FCN6].
25. Spencer Woodman, No-Show Cops and Dysfunctional Courts Keep Cook County Jail Inmates Waiting Years for a Trial, CHI. READER (Nov. 16, 2016), https://chicagoreader.com/newspolitics/no-show-cops-and-dysfunctional-courts-keep-cook-county-jail-inmates-waiting-yearsfor-a-trial/ [https://perma.cc/WCA7-3VG3]. See also Sarah Staudt, Waiting for Justice: An Examination of the Criminal Court Backlog in the Age of COVID-19, CHI. APPLESEED (Jan. 29, 2021),
https://www.chicagoappleseed.org/2021/01/28/long-waits-for-justice-cook-county-criminalcourt-backlog/ [https://perma.cc/FX95-2835] (noting how systemic problems predating COVID19 contributed to delays in resolution of cases).
26. Woodman, supra note 25.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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begin.30 People of color made up 93% of these detainees.31
The Jermain Robinson story reflects a culture of delay facilitated by an
unregulated granting of continuances.32 As we discuss, such delay stems
from prosecutors’—not judges’—control of court calls, from a historically disorganized public-defender system, or from the economics of private criminal-defense practice. Further, a lack of cooperation between the
Chicago police department and the courts and prosecutors creates delays,
as the police fail to share crucial police reports and to show up in in court.
Delays caused by this lack of cooperation and collaboration plague the
system. Additionally, the chief judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County
has been unable to take the drastic measures necessary to exert control
over the system and to insist that criminal court judges take control of the
management of their caseloads. The result, historically, as demonstrated
above, is a system that victimizes all participants.33
Most are familiar with the adage that “justice delayed is justice denied;” others may recognize that some stakeholders, including defense
lawyers, may see an advantage in delaying adjudication.34 This Article
makes a different argument. By providing quantitative and qualitative information about how justice in Cook County criminal courts actually
works, with particular focus on case delay, this Article demonstrates not
only that case delay is a significant social and legal problem, but also that
the leadership of the Circuit Court of Cook County must be more aggressive in gathering data, observing the conduct of courtroom proceedings,
promoting transparency, and rethinking the way in which Cook County’s
criminal courts conduct business.
In Part II, we review the law and literature relevant to felony caseprocessing delays. In Part III, we consider a theoretical explanation for
why the problem of felony case-processing delays in Cook County is so
hard to tackle. In Part IV, we turn to our tiered data structure to examine
different contributors to case-processing delays in Cook County felony
courtrooms. In Part V, we argue that these data demonstrate that court
delays constitute a complex and insidious system. Through this analysis,
we can distinguish different types of delays, identify the types of delays
that dominate time in court with little substantive legal progress, and then
reveal how these delays become standard operating procedure. In Part VI,
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. This is despite the fact that the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure requires that motions
for continuance be in writing and be granted only for good cause shown. See 725 ILCS 5/114-4
(2013). The court observations set forth below demonstrate that this provision of the Illinois Criminal Code is ignored in the daily practice in Cook County’s criminal courtrooms.
33. See Stoudt, supra note 25 (describing steps that should be taken to reduce case delay in
Cook County’s criminal courtrooms).
34. See generally WEILL ET AL., supra note 8.
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we argue that at least one important reform undertaken by Cook County
can succeed only if it eliminates the system’s reliance on status checks
and understands how different court actors have made delay functional
for them, if not for case processing. In Part VII, we briefly conclude.
II. LAW AND LITERATURE REGARDING CASE-PROCESSING DELAYS
Any discussion of case delay begins with an overview of constitutional
and statutory speedy-trial rights. As noted above, while case delay affects
all criminal justice stakeholders, the law ostensibly protects the accused
from lengthy pretrial incarceration. Even those defendants released to the
community on bail have a keen interest in resolving their cases. Pretrial
supervision and monitoring can impair a defendant’s ability to, e.g., hold
a job and generally contribute to the defendant’s sense of living a life on
hold.
A. The Right to Speedy Trial
The Sixth Amendment states that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.”35 Speedy-trial rights have “a rich historical lineage”:
Beginning with the Magna Carta (1215), and even as far back as the
Assize of Clarendon (1166), the defendant’s right to speedy justice was
deemed central to the English legal system’s notion of fairness. In the
United States, the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776, as well as
other state constitutions, embraced the right to a speedy trial. Given its
importance, therefore, the framers of the United States Constitution incorporated the right to a speedy trial in the Sixth Amendment.36

While its inclusion in the Bill of Rights suggests how fundamental the
speedy-trial right is to the protection of the accused, in practice it has
never received a comparable venerated status. Garcia observed that
“[a]lthough its historical basis and inclusion within the Sixth Amendment
indicate its intended significance, the Speedy Trial Clause receded into
relative obscurity, overshadowed by other provisions of the Bill of
Rights.”37 The right to a speedy trial is “generically different” from any
of the other rights enshrined in the Constitution.38
35. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
36. Alfredo Garcia, Speedy Trial Swift Justice: Full-Fledged Right or “Second Class Citizen?”,
21 SW. UNIV. L. REV. 31, 34 (1992).
37. Id.
38. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519, (1972). The Court continued:
In addition to the general concern that all accused persons be treated according to decent
and fair procedures, there is a societal interest in providing a speedy trial which exists
separate from, and at times in opposition to, the interests of the accused. The inability
of courts to provide a prompt trial has contributed to a large backlog of cases in urban
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The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on speedy trial has employed a
balancing approach to determine whether there has been a violation of
this Sixth Amendment right. This may stem, in part, from the fact that the
remedy for a speedy-trial violation is dismissal of charges. The Supreme
Court has indicated that such dismissal may be with or without prejudice,
thus weakening the remedy.39
In describing the right to a speedy trial, the Court has simultaneously
characterized it as “relative,” “amorphous,” and “slippery” but also “fundamental” to both the defendant and society.40 In Barker v. Wingo, for
instance, the Court grappled with on the one hand, its insistence that the
Sixth Amendment does indeed provide the accused procedural protections via speedy-trial rights, and on the other hand, its resistance to allowing speedy-trial rights to stand in the way of a conviction.41
In Barker, the Supreme Court addressed the following facts: Willie
Barker and Silas Manning were accused of murdering an elderly couple,42
and the case against Barker relied in part on Manning’s testimony.43 The
prosecution sought sixteen continuances in Barker’s trial over the course
of nearly five years.44 Not until the twelfth continuance did Barker file a
motion to dismiss. Nearly twenty months passed between the first time
Barker moved to dismiss and when he was tried.45 The Court noted the
closeness of the case.46 Despite the strategic nature of the State’s continuances, the Court noted defendants might “manipulate the system,” and
inferred Barker “did not want a speedy trial” because he failed to insist
on a trial from the outset.47 The Court affirmed the conviction, despite a
seemingly long delay between indictment and trial.48 In reaching its conclusion, the Court rejected any bright-line approach for determining
speedy-trial violations. Instead, it adopted a four-factor test to be used in
determining whether a speedy-trial violation has occurred.49 The Court’s
test is one subject to nearly boundless discretion by trial and reviewing
courts which, among other things, enables defendants to negotiate more effectively for
pleas of guilty to lesser offenses and otherwise manipulate the system.
Id.
39. Id. at 522.
40. Id. at 522, 533.
41. See id. at 519, 522 (emphasizing defendant’s fundamental right to speedy trial, but also
critiquing “unsatisfactorily severe remedy of dismissal” if right not accorded). For a historical and
contemporary summary of the Court’s speedy-trial jurisprudence, see Garcia, supra note 36, at 34.
42. Barker, 407 U.S. at 516.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 516, 533.
45. Id. at 519.
46. Id. at 533 (“The difficulty of the task of balancing these factors is illustrated by this case,
which we consider to be close.”).
47. Id. at 519, 534.
48. Id. at 536.
49. Id. at 530.
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courts. What the accused gambles, implied the Court, the accused may
not then decry if his strategy fails.50 Through Barker and other speedytrial cases, the Supreme Court relegated the speedy-trial right to secondclass status.51
Illinois, like nearly all state jurisdictions, has provided the accused
with both a constitutional52 and a statutory right to a speedy trial.53 Following the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Barker, the Illinois Supreme
Court, however, made clear that the Illinois constitutional right to a
speedy trial is malleable and amorphous.54 The Illinois Supreme Court
rejected any suggestion of a specific time limit that would trigger the constitutional speedy-trial right. Instead, it applied essentially the same fourfactor test used by the United States Supreme Court in making judicial
determinations of constitutional speedy-trial violations.55 In Illinois, statutory and constitutional speedy-trial rights are not co-extensive,56 yet
compliance with the statutory timelines typically prevent the constitutional violation.
The speedy-trial right is fundamental, but empirical research has
demonstrated that its consistent enforcement have been notoriously difficult.57 In his seminal study on case processing in lower criminal courts in
New Haven, Connecticut, Malcolm Feeley observed:
Although the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees the
right to a speedy trial, seemingly simple cases dragged out endlessly.
Cases in which there was no trial, no witnesses, no formal motions, no
50. See id. at 536 (observing that Barker did not object to delay until after he “lost his gamble”
on a failed trial strategy).
51. See Garcia, supra note 36, at 33–34 (arguing that despite its reach, the Court has relegated
speedy-trial right to second-class status, and its statutory counterpart, the Speedy Trial Act of 1974,
to similar second-class status). But see Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 657–58 (1992)
(holding that government’s negligence in bringing an out-of-custody defendant to trial over an 8.5year period violated defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial).
52. U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.
53.
(a) Every person in custody in this State for an alleged offense shall be tried by the court
having jurisdiction within 120 days from the date he or she was taken into custody unless
delay is occasioned by the defendant; . . . . Delay shall be considered to be agreed to by
the defendant unless he or she objects to the delay by making a written demand for trial
or an oral demand for trial on the record. . . .
(b) Every person on bail or recognizance shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction
within 160 days from the date defendant demands trial unless delay is occasioned by the
defendant. . . . The defendant’s failure to appear for any court date set by the court operates to waive the defendant’s demand for trial made under this subsection. . . .
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/103-5.
54. See generally People v. Bazzell, 369 N.E.2d 48 (Ill. 1977).
55. Id. at 50.
56. See People v. Kilcauski, 62 N.E.3d 352, 358–59 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016) (discussing tests for
speedy-trial rights).
57. See generally Timothy J. Searight, The Sixth Amendment Right to a Speedy Trial: Applying
Barker v. Wingo after United States v. Doggett, 22 W. STATE U. L. REV. 61 (1994) (detailing
evolving standards of Sixth Amendment and changes in its application over time).
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pretrial involvement from the bench, and no presentence investigation
still required as many as eight or ten different appearances spread over
six months.
Conversely, many complex cases were cut short because the accused
had agreed to plead guilty at arraignment after the prosecutor advised
him to “be smart and get it over with today.”58

Feeley painted the picture of a court system that perhaps aspires to
conduct speedy trials, but does little to achieve that goal. Feeley argued
that for a criminal defendant, the process of moving through the lower
courts is really the primary punishment, rather than any ultimate sanction
that may be imposed by the court.59 Further, Feeley concluded that caseprocessing delays are not coincidental; rather, they are inherent in the way
adversarial processes in court are structured.60
Ostrom, Hanson, and Kleiman wrote that “a well-functioning court
system is expected to provide due process through decisions and actions
based on individual attention to each case using consistent court-wide
practices operating within predictable time frames.”61 Courts, however,
have not implemented this normative preference for consistency and predictability. Some scholars have argued that rigorous insistence on speedy
trial may not take into account the more nuanced process of doing individual justice within a backlogged system. Scholars Roy Flemming, Peter
Nardulli, and James Eisenstein argued that “doing justice” can take a substantial amount of time and that this perhaps explains why judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys are not exclusively focused on shortening
case-processing times.62
Even with an interpretation of speedy-trial rights as literally invoking
a need to move with speed, courts are unlikely to conceptualize certain
types of continuances or delays as violating speedy-trial rights. Courts do
not generally find that delays caused by a defendant or defense counsel
violate speedy-trial rights.63 Courts may require defendants to
58. MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER
CRIMINAL COURT 10 (1979).
59. See generally MALCOLM M. FEELEY, The Process Is the Punishment, in CRIME, LAW, AND
SOCIETY 139, 139–88 (2013) (elaborating further on Feeley’s argument from his 1979 book that
process serves as primary source of punishment, particularly analyzing how decisions made in pretrial phases necessarily determine eventual outcomes).
60. MALCOLM M. FEELEY, COURT REFORM ON TRIAL: WHY SIMPLE SOLUTIONS FAIL 32 (Quid
Pro Books 2013).
61. Brian J. Ostrom, Roger A. Hanson & Matthew Kleiman, Improving the Pace of Criminal
Case Processing in State Trial Courts, 29 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 736, 737 (2018).
62. Roy B. Flemming, Peter F. Nardulli & James Eisenstein, The Timing of Justice in Felony
Trial Courts, 9 L. & POL’Y 179, 179–80 (1987).
63. See Gregory P.N. Joseph, Speedy Trial Rights in Application, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 611,
624 (1980) (“Predictably, courts are seldom receptive to allegations that speedy trial rights have
been denied as a result of delays engendered by affirmative action either of the defendant or of
defense counsel.”).
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affirmatively or proactively state their speedy-trial rights before finding
them violated.64 Courts also make allowances for circumstances beyond
the defendant’s control, like a witness being ill or unavailable, that are
not generally conceptualized as violations of speedy-trials rights.65 Some
evidence has suggested that delaying trial may be advantageous to the
defense, since extended delays may impact the prosecution’s ability to
bring evidence.66 Interestingly, some recent research found the exact opposite, concluding that increased case-processing time was associated
with more severe punishments.67
The review of the law clarifies why cases like Kalief Browder’s were
unaffected by the legal speedy-trial framework. The empirical literature
demonstrates how courts have responded to this weak “fundamental”
right. Indeed, in Browder’s case, we see how the administrative task of
court calendaring intersects with the legal mandate. There, the prosecutor
requested one-week extensions, but calendar logistics required most appearances to be scheduled extremely far in advance.68 This meant that the
case’s timeline could extend far beyond the six months from arraignment
New York requires, while each delay was only counted as one week
against the prosecutor’s clock.69 Because speedy-trial rights do not define
what “speedy” means, and because these rights are so full of exceptions
case processing is paradoxically heavily, but ineffectually regulated. To
consider this complex problem, this Article turns to a review of scholarship on the scope of the problem of case processing delay before considering a theory of path dependency that might help explain the persistence
of case delay as a prominent feature of case processing in Cook County
criminal courts.
B. A National Snapshot of Case-Processing Delays
In 1987, the American Bar Association (ABA) laid out a series of
standards for how long felony case processing should take. These standards asserted that from arrest to disposition, a court should dispose of
64. See id. at 634 (“In constitutional practice, however, virtually all courts still decline to discharge a defendant on the basis of constitutional speedy trial deprivation unless the defense has
taken affirmative action to obtain a speedy trial, except in extraordinary circumstances.”).
65. Id. at 640 (noting instances of trial delays not generally considered violations of speedy-trial
right).
66. Richard S. Frase, The Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 667, 668 (1975) (identifying conflicts between defendants’ interest in speedy trials and defense strategies).
67. See Lin Liu, R.R. Dunlea & Besiki Luka Kutateladze, Time for Time: Uncovering Case
Processing Duration as a Source of Punitiveness, CRIM. & DELINQ. 1, 17–20 (2021) (discussing
the results from empirical studies suggesting that higher case-processing times correlated with
higher likelihood of custodial sentences, prison sentences, and lengthy sentences).
68. Gonnerman, supra note 1 (highlighting prosecution’s requests for one-week extensions because “[t]he People are not ready” resulted in court dates set six weeks or more in the future).
69. Id. (noting that as long as a prosecutor filed a Notice of Readiness, delays caused by court
congestion do not count toward number of elapsed days).
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90% of felony cases in 120 days, 98% in 180 days, and a full 100% within
one year, though these standards would be updated several times. 70 A
study of nine felony courts determined that no studied court could meet
this original standard without modifications.71 A newer set of standards—
a joint effort by the National Center for State Courts, the American Bar
Association, and the National Association for Court Management—was
put forward in 2011. Under these new Model Time Standards, 75% of
felony cases should be disposed of in 90 days, 90% within 180 days, and
98% within 365 days.72 More recently, the Effective Criminal Case Management Project analyzed data from over 136 courts and found that no
court met the national time standard.73
Research on case-processing delays generally categorizes two sources
of delay: individual case-related factors and organization-related factors.74 Numerous studies have been undertaken to try to determine exactly
what leads to case-processing delays. The same study from the Effective
Criminal Case Management Project attributed improvements in timelines
to the number of continuances and hearings, as well as to the amount of
control the court has over scheduling.75 Other studies and scholars have
concluded the difference is whether a trial ends with a plea, as those require less processing time than things like jury trials.76 Notably, more
than 90% of criminal cases resulting in a conviction are the result of plea
bargaining.77 In a previous study these authors undertook, we determined
there were numerous sources of micro-level and macro-level dysfunctions in the larger court system.78 Researchers have also uncovered some
factors that may not be related to timeliness. The Effective Criminal Case
Management Project study, for example, concluded that organizational
70. STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL COURTS AS AMENDED § 2.52(d) (Am. Bar Ass’n 1987).
71. BRIAN J. OSTROM & ROGER A. HANSON, EFFICIENCY, TIMELINESS, AND QUALITY: A NEW
PERSPECTIVE FROM NINE STATE CRIMINAL TRIAL COURTS 16 (1999), https://www.ojp.gov/
pdffiles1/nij/178403-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/W2BP-L4A8].
72. RICHARD VAN DUIZEND, DAVID C. STEELMAN & LEE SUSKIN, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE
TRIAL CTS., MODEL TIME STANDARDS FOR STATE TRIAL COURTS 4 (2011),
https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0032/18977/model-time-standards-for-state-trialcourts.pdf [https://perma.cc/D7EV-JQYT].
73. OSTROM ET AL., supra note 16, at 6 (finding that, on average, courts included in study resolved 83% of felony cases within 365 days).
74. See Ostrom, Hanson & Kleiman, supra note 61, at 738 (“[T]here is a long-standing belief
that much of the variation in criminal case processing time ought to be related to (a) individual
case-related factors and (b) organization-related factors.”).
75. See OSTROM ET AL., supra note 16, at 6 (finding that number of continuances per case and
number of hearings per case drive case-processing time).
76. See Margaret F. Klemm, A Look at Case Processing Time in Five Cities, 14 J. CRIM. JUST. 9,
9 (1986) (noting that trials take longer than pleas).
77. RAM SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., IN THE SHADOWS: A REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH ON PLEA
BARGAINING 2 (2020).
78. See Hawilo et al., supra note 17, at 193 (dividing a number of complicated inefficiencies
into two categories).
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factors (including the size of the court, the type of calendar, and the number of filings per judge, among other variables) had little effect on caseprocessing times.79
C. Why Case-Processing Delays Matter
Case-processing delays matter, whether or not they violate Sixth
Amendment rights or statutory rights to a speedy trial; they matter because of the tangible harms done to defendants and victims. Case-processing delays keep presumed-innocent people in custody, exacerbate
known contributors to inequality, and ultimately backlog the criminal justice system in ways that frustrate justice both theoretically and practically.
While this Article does not seek to examine the broader field of the
philosophy of criminal punishment, here we briefly connect timeliness
with theories of effectiveness of criminal punishment. The deterrence theory of crime is based on the premise that a would-be criminal will be
deterred from committing a crime due to the certainty, severity, and celerity of punishment.80 This means that knowing you will eventually be
punished, and perhaps even severely, is not sufficient to deter crime—
punishment must also be swift.81 This aspirational and theoretical intention is wholly at odds with the actual process of felony dispositions,
which are not at all swift and leave defendants stuck in limbo.
A majority of individuals currently in jail are presumed innocent. A
study from the Prison Policy Initiative concluded that only about onethird of the roughly 720,000 inmates in local jails have actually been convicted of a crime, meaning that pretrial detention is principally responsible for filling jails.82 Incarceration in jails is racially disparate to an extreme degree across the United States, with Black Americans bearing a
majority of the burden of the negative consequences of both jailing and
pretrial detention. Work by the Vera Institute calculated that Black people
79. See OSTROM ET AL., supra note 16, at 11 (finding that active case-flow management made
biggest difference in case-processing times).
80. See Lawrence Friedman, The Legal System: A Social Science Perspective (1975), reprinted
in STEWART MACAULAY, LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN & ELIZABETH MERTZ, LAW IN ACTION: A
SOCIO-LEGAL READER 397, 398 (Stewart Macaulay, Lawrence M. Friedman & Elizabeth Mertz
eds., 2007) (outlining deterrence theory).
81. Notably, scholars find that deterrence theory is largely insufficient to explain crime and does
not have any deterrent effect. See Travis C. Pratt et al., The Empirical Status of Deterrence Theory:
A Meta-Analysis, in TAKING STOCK: THE STATUS OF CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY 367, 385 (Francis
T. Cullen, John Paul Wright & Kristie Blevins eds., 2011) (“To that end, the deterrence perspective
. . . falls well short of being a theory that should continue to enjoy the allegiance of criminologists.”).
82. Joshua Aiken, Era of Mass Expansion: Why State Officials Should Fight Jail Growth,
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (May 31, 2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/jailsovertime.html [https://perma.cc/2F8S-SDB7].
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are 3.6 times more likely to be jailed in local jails than white people.83
Likewise, pretrial incarceration is intrinsically related to the defendant’s
ability to afford bail, leaving some defendants to spend the entire lifecycle
of their case in jail when a similarly situated defendant with more money
would not have remained incarcerated.84
This disparity is particularly acute because pretrial detention is bad for
both court outcomes and for individuals’ lives.85 Studies have concluded
that even brief jail stays increase the risk of long-term trauma exposure
and meaningfully interrupts the lives of presumed-innocent persons.86
These harms affect the most disadvantaged members of society and in
turn harm their families and their communities.87 Studies have also found
that pretrial delay predicts worse court outcomes, including higher likelihoods of conviction (based on propensity to plead guilty).88 Work by
Leslie and Pope netted the disparities and consequences of pretrial detention together, finding that the resultant guilty pleas and, in some cases,
more severe sentences are disproportionately affecting poor and minority
defendants.89 It is clear, then, that case-processing delays, and the effects
that accompany them, like pretrial detention and worse court outcomes,
are a source of harm perpetuated by the justice system nationally. Next,
we refine our focus to Cook County courts in anticipation of making
meaning of those delays in particular.
In this Article, we focus on the system mechanics of the court and outcomes for defendants, but criminal defendants are not the only individuals greatly affected by court delays. Scholars have also analyzed how
case-processing delays hurt victims. In their study of domestic violence
survivors, Bell, Perez, Goodman, and Dutton found that the survivors encountered numerous delays in the courtroom, often having to take time
off work or procure childcare to attend multiple hearings that would not
83. RAM SUBRAMANIAN, KRISTINE RILEY & CHRIS MAI, DIVIDED JUSTICE: TRENDS IN BLACK
AND WHITE JAIL INCARCERATION, 1990–2013, at 22 (2018).
84. See LÉON DIGARD & ELIZABETH SWAVOLA, JUSTICE DENIED: THE HARMFUL AND
LASTING EFFECTS OF PRETRIAL DETENTION 6 (2019) (highlighting how individuals unable to afford bail often remain in jail for their case’s entire pendency).
85. See id. at 2 (finding that pretrial detention negatively impacts an individual’s court appearance, conviction, sentencing, and future involvement with criminal-justice system).
86. WEILL ET AL., supra note 8, at 6.
87. Claudia N. Anderson, Joshua C. Cochran & Andrea N. Montes, The Pains of Pretrial Detention: Theory and Research on the Oft-Overlooked Experiences of Pretrial Jail Stays, in
HANDBOOK ON PRETRIAL JUSTICE 13, 13–14 (Christine S. Scott-Hayward, Jennifer E. Copp &
Stephen Demuth eds., 2021).
88. Will Dobbie, Jacob Goldin & Crystal S. Yang, The Effects of Pretrial Detention on Conviction, Future Crime, and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, 108 AM. ECON.
REV. 201, 225 (2018).
89. See Emily Leslie & Nolan G. Pope, The Unintended Impact of Pretrial Detention on Case
Outcomes: Evidence from New York City Arraignments, 60 J.L. & ECON. 529, 554–55 (2017) (“The
impact of pretrial detention on case outcomes explains a large portion of the systematically worse
case outcomes of minority defendants, who are more likely than whites to be detained pretrial.”).
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result in meaningful outcomes.90 This also led to the survivor feeling
unsafe and unprotected because, as one woman put it,
I had . . . gone to court every week for five weeks, just to keep an ex
parte going. Reason? Incompetence. They could not locate [my partner]
while he was incarcerated, couldn’t serve him papers, or get him into
court. How in the world could these people protect me?91

D. Felony Case-Processing Delays in Cook County
Cook County, Illinois, is home to 5.1 million residents, making it the
second-largest county in the United States and the largest county in the
State of Illinois.92 In Cook County, approximately 41.8% of residents
identify as non-Hispanic white, while 22.7% identify as Black.93 A
further 23.96% of residents identify as Hispanic.94 Compared to the
national average, there is more wage inequality in Illinois, with poverty
concentrated in pockets of the city.95 Cook County is also home to 26th
and California, one of the largest and busiest criminal courts in the United
States, handling over 22,000 cases every year.96
The Circuit Court of Cook County has, to put it mildly, a checkered
history. The Illinois Crime Survey (1929)97 documented organized
crime’s influence in the processing and resolution of cases, including the
delay of cases in which members of the mob were charged with crimes.98
The history of the influence of Cook County’s Democratic Party is welldocumented, including the party’s control over the selection of judges to

90. Margret E. Bell et al., Battered Women’s Perceptions of Civil and Criminal Court Helpfulness: The Role of Court Outcome and Process, 17 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 71, 79 (2011).
91. Id.
92. U.S. County Populations 2022, WORLD POPULATION REV., https://worldpopulationreview.com/us-counties/il/cook-county-population (last visited Jan. 20, 2022) [https://perma.
cc/6LHK-CDSE].
93. Cook County, IL, DATA USA, https://datausa.io/profile/geo/cook-county-il (last visited Jan.
20, 2021) [https://perma.cc/JD5A-D84U].
94. Id.
95. See id. (mapping median household income across Cook County, in which lowest median
household income is concentrated on Chicago’s south and west sides).
96. Jason Meisner, 26th and Cal Courthouse Rich with History and Charm, CHI. TRIB. (June
11, 2012, 12:00 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2012-06-11-ct-met-criminalcourts-building-20120611-story.html [https://perma.cc/L29F-3RT8].
97. See John Landesco, Organized Crime in Chicago, in ILL. ASS’N FOR CRIM. JUST., supra
note 19, at 815, 907–17 (describing in particular influence and power enjoyed by John Torrio, a
notorious gangster and beer runner during Prohibition).
98. See, e.g., id. at 911–12 (discussing long delays following indictment of associates of John
Torrio for murder; the charges were eventually nolle prossed).
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run for office, an unfortunate phenomenon that continues to this day.99
The Circuit Court of Cook County, and in particular, its Criminal
Division, has historically neglected the best interests of the citizens who
come before the court as victims, witnesses, and defendants, as well as
community members who are affected by crime. One of these “best
interests” is the need to provide fair, efficient, and speedy resolution of
cases. As history demonstrates, this has not been even a primary focus of
the Circuit Court of Cook County.100
Despite the best efforts of its own expert and committed personnel,
Cook County has struggled to meet even its own standards for caseprocessing times. Peter Coolsen, the Court Administrator for the Criminal
Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County for many years, conducted
an analysis of over 10,000 cases, subdivided into tracks101 ranging from
three to eighteen months. He found that 39% of all pending cases he
studied exceeded the Cook County time standard.102 Figure 1 visualizes
Coolsen’s findings as over-time percentages by track, demonstrating that
case-processing times are a problem for all levels of felony cases, not just
the most severe.

99. Maya Dukmasova & Chloe Hilles, Judicial Hopefuls Seek Cook County Democratic Party’s
Endorsement for 2022 Primary, INJUSTICE WATCH (Oct. 15, 2021), https://www.
injusticewatch.org/news/judicial-elections/2021/pre-slating-judicial-candidates-2022-primary/
[https://perma.cc/3SP8-S7XT] (detailing the obscure “pre-slating” event where prospective candidates for judge seeking party’s nomination present their credentials to Cook County Democratic
committee).
100. See generally, SPECIAL COMM’N ON ADMIN. OF JUST. IN COOK CNTY., supra note 24.
101. JAMES PETER COOLSEN, DIFFERENTIATED CASE MANAGEMENT IN COOK COUNTY
(CHICAGO), ILLINOIS: STAKEHOLDER PERCEPTIONS AND EMPIRICAL DATA 54–56 (2007). The
tracks correspond reasonably well to felony classes: Track #1 consisted of Class 4 and Class 3
felonies; Track #2 consisted of Class 2 and Class 1 felonies; Track #3 consisted of Class X felonies;
and Track #4 consisted of Class M felonies. Id. at 53.
102. Id. at 56.
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Figure 1: % of Pending Cases Over Time in Cook County103
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Stakeholders surveyed in 2010 told the Appleseed Center for Fair
Courts that since 1999, more punitive and more complex sentencing
changes in Illinois laws have contributed to case delay.104
More recently, research by Rountree, Hawilo, and Geraghty found that
in 76% of court time was allocated to status checks rather than substantive
active case processes and that 84% of cases were before the judge for two
minutes or less and consisted of little but setting another court date.105
This literature, taken in sum, presents a grim picture of a universe of
harmful court delays in Cook County. In Part III, we introduce path
dependency theory as a way of understanding the current stable system
of delays and why such a system is so impervious to change.
III. PATH DEPENDENCY AND COURT PROCESSES
We have established that Cook County is very much stuck in a
seemingly never-ending cycle of case delays. In this section, we introduce
a theoretical framework that offers a useful way of understanding how
such a problem can come to exist and how it continues to exist. We will
explain this theoretical framework and then apply it to empirical data
from Cook County. We then consider what that means for generating
solutions.
103. Id. at 54.
104. See CHI. APPLESEED, PRETRIAL DELAY & LENGTH OF STAY IN COOK COUNTY JAIL:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3 (2013), http://www.chicagoappleseed.org/wp-content/uploads/
2012/06/CAFFJ-Pret-Trial-Delay-and-Length-of-Stay-Executive-Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/
CMB3-CY89] (noting that mandatory minimum sentences and sentence enhancements create “hard
bargaining,” which leads to protracted negotiation processes that prolong pretrial detention).
105. Meredith Martin Rountree, Maria Hawilo & Thomas Geraghty, Preliminary Report: Qualitative Study of Cook County Criminal Felony Court Processing 7 (2019) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with authors).
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The Cook County courts in our data process cases one step at a time,
with each court appearance and each motion coming one after another.
Because the steps are not totally separate or independent, we propose
looking at the cumulative importance of the adjudication process for each
case, replicated in every case the court oversees. Therefore, instead of
numerous problematic individual steps, we have a system that is
overburdened by cumulative delays produced by many individual steps.
A theoretical perspective that considers the unique lifecycles and
functions of systems provides a useful framework to understand the
origin and continuing nature of case-processing delays in Cook County.
Path-dependence theory is particularly helpful in this regard. In its
simplest form, path-dependence theory says that the outcomes of systems
can be greatly influenced by what comes before them, even if some of the
earlier steps are very distant from the eventual outcome.106 This is not as
simple as saying that “history matters;” instead, it is a more complex
understanding of how individual steps or decisions can compound.107
Here, we use a stricter theoretical conceptualization of path dependence
advanced by Schreyögg and Sydow in their book, The Hidden Dynamics
of Path Dependence: Institutions and Organizations. They asserted that
a path-dependent organization is one where a sequence of decisions limits
future choices, eventually even creating an imperative where functionally
only one choice remains.108 This means that by the time you near the end
of a complicated process, you only have one realistic set of choices to
make at the very end.
One consequence of path dependence is that no single individual can
break this cycle. Instead, individual court actors and court users become
cogs in the machine of the system as the system itself limits their choices.
Path-dependency theory refers to this state as a “system equilibrium” or
“system lock-in,” where the system becomes dependent on operating in
one specific way.109 As this process repeats itself, it defines a path

106. Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 332, 332 (1985).
107. See Scott E. Page, Path Dependence, Q. J. POL. SCI. 87, 87–88 (2006) (differentiating between types of path dependence and laying out four related causes of path dependency: increasing
returns, self-reinforcement, positive feedback, and lock-ins).
108. See Georg Schreyögg & Jorg Sydow, Understanding Institutional and Organizational
Path Dependencies, in THE HIDDEN DYNAMICS OF PATH DEPENDENCE: INSTITUTIONS AND
ORGANIZATIONS 3, 3–5 (Georg Schreyögg & Jorg Sydow eds., 2009) (recontextualizing past events
for future action as foregoing decisions for current and future decision-making).
109. Paul A. David, Path Dependence, Its Critics, and the Quest for ‘Historical Economics’, in
EVOLUTION AND PATH DEPENDENCE IN ECONOMIC IDEAS: PAST AND PRESENT 15, 25–26 (Pierre
Garrouste & Stavros Ioannides eds., 2001). David asserted that he does not take up the term lockin as an assertion that human actors have no agency or that people are purely rational actors. Id. at
25. Rather he asserted that the term simply described the process by which a system comes to a
stable equilibrium that will endure unless intervened upon by some external shock. Id. at 25–26.
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through a self-reinforcing process, thus the name path dependence.110 The
ultimate result of this process is a lack of flexibility or ability to chart a
different path within the organization. As Schreyögg and Sydow put it,
[o]ne particular choice or action pattern has become the predominant
mode; flexibility has been lost. Even new entrants into this field of
action have to adopt it. The problem of a lock-in becomes particularly
obvious in cases where a more efficient alternative appears but a switch
is no longer possible, and the result is actual or potential inefficiency.111

This means that even individuals who want to change the way the
system works face almost insurmountable roadblocks because of how the
system has grown accustomed to—and dependent on—functioning.
Considering the court as a type of path-dependent system has distinct
advantages in allowing us to conceptualize case-processing delays as
multifaceted and inevitable. To do this we specifically apply pathdependency theory to criminal court processes.
Take, for instance, dispositions as a typical court system outcome
measure. Applying Schreyögg and Sydow’s definition of path
dependency, we hypothesize that a disposition is significantly influenced
by the steps that precede it. That is, we propose that decisions made by
legal actors, in all corners of the courtroom, determine what happens next
in a case. Next, we consider whether decisions made by any stakeholder
(be it defense, prosecution, or the court) limit the subsequent choices that
other actors can make. This is surely true, whether that decision be
something case-related (like a decision to file a motion) or an error that
delays or changes court proceedings.
The pivotal question, then, is whether a sequence of decisions can so
limit the path forward that it permits only that path. We will examine this
question using three sources of empirical data. We argue that these data
demonstrate that the universe of choices is so narrowed that the system is
all but required to make certain decisions to keep itself stable. In this way,
we contend that the system of delays at the Cook County criminal courts
at 26th and California is not simply attributable to the decisions of
individuals to create delays, but rather to the way justice is carried out in
Cook County. If this thesis is correct, we would expect to find the
decisions that give rise to felony case-processing delays to be very
common and very widely used. That is, we would expect to see the same
types of decisions leading to the same types of delayed outcomes over
and over again. Further, we would not expect those decisions to be
attributable to one individual court actor or even one group of court
110. Schreyögg & Sydow, supra note 108, at 5 (identifying drivers of self-reinforcing dynamics
as externalities arising from actions of agents or learned individual behaviors, which are adopted
by the regime and create a state of equilibrium).
111. Id. at 7.
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actors.
Despite what seem like satisfying parallels, there is relatively little
work applying path-dependency theory to court-system processes,
though some scholars have applied it to specific relevant decision-making
aspects of law, particularly with analyses of path dependency in
constitutional adjudication.112 Ostrom, Hanson, and Kleinman
conceptualized this problem of the dependent system somewhat
differently, focusing instead on the competing challenges of balancing a
caseload with providing the individualized attention to a case across
many individuals and timelines.113 Ultimately, Ostrom et al. were
persuaded that the interdependent relationship within the universe of
cases takes precedence, advocating that judges allocate their time using a
proportionality principle, i.e., prioritize the most complex cases.114 We
have found no research contextualizing how the use (or lack of use) of
proportionality principles might contribute to the current equilibrium of
delays in court. That is, more research should be done to decipher how
much emphasis on proportionality would be necessary to release court
systems from their current state of lock-in. In the section to follow, we
introduce three sources of data that will help shine a light on various
stages and outcomes of path dependency at 26th and California.
IV. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
This Article introduces a three-tiered data structure designed to
examine macro-level patterns and contextual features of court delays at
26th and California. We refer to these three data tiers as levels, titling
them as follows: Level 1: Macro-Level Trends, Level 2: SingleProceeding Observations, and Level 3: Ethnographic Observations.
These levels of data can be conceptualized akin to a funnel, moving from
112. See Jeremy Patrick, Path Dependency, the High Court, and the Constitution, 30 J. JUD.
ADMIN. 51, 51 (2020) (advancing a path-dependency hypothesis to explain why some elements of
Australian constitutional law have remained the same while others have changed). Though notably,
the author qualified this hypothesis as tentative. Id.; see generally Michael J. Gerhardt, The Limited
Path Dependency of Precedent, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 903 (2004) (laying out scholarly arguments
both for and against readings of path-dependency theory in constitutional adjudication). Gerhardt
ultimately concluded that, despite legitimate concerns about the extent of robust path dependency,
precedent continues to be relevant to constitutional law. Id. at 999. Gerhardt urged scholars to undertake additional empirical research on precedent and engage with more recent empirical findings
to illuminate the matter further. Id. at 1000.
113. Ostrom, Hanson & Kleiman, supra note 61, at 737 (emphasizing that a well-functioning
court system is expected to provide due process, which requires individual attention to each case).
114. Id. Ostrom et al. suggests here that proportionality principle considers the relationship between a punishment and the complexity of a case. This is meaningful distinct from seriousness of
a crime, since hypothetically a serious crime may be less time consuming and require less resources
from the court, though there is likely a correlation between seriousness and complexity more generally. The conceptualization of proportionality more realistically allocates limited time and resources.
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the broadest type of data to the narrowest. Each type of data serves a
different and important purpose, so all are necessary to this analysis. In
this section, we briefly provide the methodological details of each level
of data before looking at each source of data in detail, and then describe
the results and themes emerging from those results.
A. Methodology
Each level of data in this analysis comes from a different author and
different methodology, allowing us to combine multiple perspectives into
our analysis. Level 1 data comes from the Cook County State’s Attorney
Open Data Portal. Upon her election as State’s Attorney, Kim Foxx
committed to increasing the transparency and accessibility of data in
Cook County.115 This data portal is one such effort and contains a range
of information. In this analysis, we use the Dispositions data, refined
specifically to cases that were prosecuted at 26th and California.116 This
yielded a dataset containing 480,486 charges. Because our principal
interest is not at the charge level, but at the case level, we further
restricted our analysis to the primary charge in each case.117 This yielded
a dataset of 154,623 cases where dispositions were entered between
2011–21. We further cleaned the data to remove cases that were the result
of typographical errors.118 Finally, we created a new variable to measure
days from arrest to disposition. This variable was constructed by
subtracting the arrest date from the disposition date and storing the
resultant number of days. This key variable will constitute the measure
of case-processing time from arrest to disposition.
Level 2 data are single-issue-proceeding observational data created by
the authors and trained student observers. Professors trained a class of
students to collect data by observing court hearings at 26th and California
felony courts. Students were provided a worksheet, and instructed to note
information such as time of proceeding, length of proceeding, and result
of each individual proceeding. This data-gathering resulted in 1,166
115. The Data-Driven CCSAO, COOK CNTY. STATE’S ATT’Y, https://www.cook
countystatesattorney.org/data [https://perma.cc/EGC3-GBSV] (last visited Apr. 2, 2022).
116. Dispositions, COOK CNTY. GOV’T: OPEN DATA, https://datacatalog.cookcounty
il.gov/Courts/Dispositions/apwk-dzx8 [https://perma.cc/M3W8-EXWK] (last updated Jan. 3,
2022).
117. This is provided as a variable in the origin dataset and did not require making a methodological decision.
118. This required removing and recoding several variables. We removed data in three instances. First, if a defendant had a disposition date that occurred before their arrest date. Second, if
there was no arrest date entered for a given defendant. Third, defendants who had a disposition year
that occurred after 2021 (this third scenario was either extremely incomplete data from 2022 or
keystroke errors occurring in eight observations). In total, these three cleaning procedures removed
3,999 observations from the data. We also had to recode or collapse several variables including
gender, race, and dispositional outcomes. This was done either to fix inconsistent capitalization that
prevented categories from merging or to merge small but conceptually similar categories.
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unique observations of single proceedings.
Level 3 data are courtroom ethnography data created by the authors
and a trained student observer.119 The graduate student from the
Northwestern University Medill School of Journalism took observational
field notes that constituted raw ethnographic data. From June 19, 2018,
to October 16, 2018, the student conducted thirty-three periods of
observation, yielding detailed notes about 3,144 minutes of observation
across fifteen courtrooms and covering 215 different criminal cases. To
process these data, we designed a coding scheme that separated the raw
ethnographic quotes into different analytic themes. Some of these themes
required us to source quotations from the ethnography that typified
different types of delays that the observers saw in different courtrooms.
In the current Article, we strategically sampled these quotations to
provide on-the-ground context for the observable daily operations of
Cook County. This left us with a universe of data as represented in Figure
2 below.
Figure 2: Three-Tiered Data Structure, Levels 1-3

B. Macro-Level Trends Results
The top-level data, Level 1, help identify aggregate trends over time at
26th and California. Analyzing macro-level patterns is particularly useful
as a first step due to law’s tendency to individualize cases, making it more
119. See generally Hawilo et al., supra note 17.
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difficult to see how patterns transcend individual cases. By looking at
larger patterns, we see what is consistent in the way the court functions.
We plot the number of dispositions and the average case-processing time
per year (calculated as days from arrest to disposition) in two visual forms
below. Figure 3 is in tabular form, while Table 4 plots the change over
time as a series of bars. What these figures clearly show is that caseprocessing times have substantially increased, even as the number of
dispositions has decreased.
Figure 3: Average Time from Arrest to Disposition, 2011–21

Number of Dispositions

Average Processing
Time

2011

15,074

223.11

2012

18,515

237.04

2013

17,675

282.49

2014

18,148

298.97

2015

15,246

322.42

2016

14,105

363.11

2017

13,571

377.05

2018

11,991

390.77

2019

11,380

373.51

2020

5,203

424.78

2021

9,716

502.66

Figure 4: Change in Case Processing Times, 2011–21

Av. # of Days
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100
0
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

Year

Figures 3 and 4 show that average felony case-processing times nearly
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doubled from 2011 to 2018 before spiking to a relative maximum during
the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and 2021.120 Figures 3 and 4 also show
that the number of felony dispositions had substantially decreased, even
in the years before COVID-19. Years 2018 and 2019 had the fewest
dispositions of any of the studied year prior to their pandemic-era
counterparts.
The Level 1 data also demonstrate that the impacts of felony case
processing are felt very unequally by different demographic groups. The
average age of defendants was 32.9, though this number had a wide
range, beginning at seventeen years of age. The vast majority of
defendants were men (88.82%), while substantially fewer (11.18%) were
women. The data were also highly disparate along racial lines, with
116,198 (77.26%) of defendants identified as Black or African American,
22,833 (15.18%) as Hispanic or Latino, 10.472 (6.96%) as white, and a
much smaller percentage were Asian, American Indian, or some other
race or ethnicity.
We also considered predictive relationships between individual
demographic characteristics and various case-level features that might
substantially affect felony case-processing times. To explore these
potential patterns, we predicted case-processing times using a linear
regression model, specified to include defendant race, age, and gender as
well as disposition year and the several types of disposition outcomes.
The reference categories for the model are white race, male gender, and
120. The tail-end of the data distribution in the macro-level trend data (Level 1) of this analysis
depicts a ballooning of felony case processing times during the COVID-19 pandemic. There is
some explanation for this rapid increase simply by considering court closures during COVID-19.
Cook County courts were closed for a majority of 2020 and part of 2021, which also led to the nearextinction of trials during that time period. See Sarah Staudt, Slowly Returning to Normal: A Look
at the Cook County Court Case Backlog in Autumn 2021, CHI. APPLESEED (Nov. 8, 2021),
https://www.chicagoappleseed.org/2021/11/08/slowly-returning-to-normal-backlog-autumn2021/ [https://perma.cc/6STZ-NW9L] (discussing effects of COVID-19 on case backlog). As of
April 2021, more than 2,600 defendants had been in custody at Cook County Jail or on electronic
home monitoring for more than a year. Carlos Ballesteros, Court Backlog Leaves Hundreds of
People in Cook County Jail for More Than a Year, INJUSTICE WATCH (Apr. 28, 2021),
https://www.injusticewatch.org/news/courts/2021/cook-county-jail-court-backlog-coronavirus/
[https://perma.cc/69DX-RLWH]. Problems compounded for Cook County when the State of Illinois reinstated speedy-trial rights on October 1, 2021. Staudt, supra. Kim Foxx stated her intention
to prioritize violent crimes and crimes with victims, but according to the Cook County Sheriff’s
Office, around 80% of jailed individuals were accused of a violent crime. Ballesteros, supra.
Cook County has appeared to turn the tide on rising felony case-processing times, disposing
more cases than it initiated beginning in June of 2021. Despite what seems like headway, Cook
County cannot forget the consequences of detaining a high number of individuals during a global
pandemic. Studies show that Cook County jails served as incubators and spreaders of COVID-19
to such an extent that the Cook County Jail alone was associated with 15.9% of new COVID-19
infections in Chicago. Eric Reinhart & Daniel L. Chen, Incarceration and Its Disseminations:
COVID-19 Pandemic Lessons from Chicago’s Cook County Jail, 39 HEALTH AFFS. 1412, 1412
(2020).

772

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 53

a disposition outcome of nolle prosequi. The results of this model are
estimated in Figure 5 below. We estimate the model first using all
available observations, and next in a subset of cases that only includes
homicides. They offer this homicide-specific example for two reasons: 1)
to be able to interpret a subset of the data absent the potentially spurious
variable of offense type, and 2) because delays for highly punitive
criminal categories may be systematically more severe. Indeed, in these
data, the 1,144 homicide cases had an average case-processing time of
1110.03 days, far outpacing any yearly average reported in Figures 3 and
4.
Figure 5: Predicting Case Processing Times

Disposition year

Model 1
All Cases

Model 2
Homicide Cases
Only121

(b/se)

(b/se)

24.658***

93.158***

(0.4)

(7.38)

-53.610***

133.779

(4.7)

(77.55)

30.868***

123.68

(5.44)

(86.06)

90.506***

-84.833

(17.97)

(427.01)

103.696**

-110.836

(33.09)

(306.83)

-31.524***

-30.09

(3.78)

(62.99)

Race
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Other

Female
Other

319.054
(228.34)

Age

-1.508***

-6.133***

(0.10)

(1.76)

121. Does not include attempted homicides or reckless homicides
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Disposition Outcome
Plead Guilty

-53.816***

-107.787*

(2.67)

(45.91)

250.266***

112.314*

(6.46)

(48.63)

158.018***

-15.314

(5.69)

(63.39)

312.709***

-296.381**

(10.7)

(111.73)

-49265.445***

-186677.961***

(810.92)

(14888.01)

0.06

0.157

Find/Verdict Guilty

Find/Verdict Not
Guilty
Other

Constant

R-squared
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Figure 5 indicates that several factors operate logically to increase
case-processing times. First, these statistical results confirm the trends
reported in the descriptive statistics, indicating that case-processing times
have been increasing significantly over time. Note, for instance, the
positive and highly significant coefficients in both models for the
disposition year variable, indicating that case processing times are longer
in more recent years. Next, the differences between Model 1 and Model
2 generally seem to support previous findings that variation between
offense categories helps predicts felony case-processing times. Future
research on Cook County felony case processing should carefully create
categories of more offenses and more robustly test this conclusion.
Consistent with the descriptive trends in Figures 3 and 4, there is a
significant positive relationship between the disposition year and the
average case-processing time in both models (p<0.00).122 Replicating the
findings of work by Klemm, pleas were significantly negatively
associated with increasing case-processing times, while trial findings and
verdicts were significantly positively associated with increased case122. P values are probabilities, ranging between 0 and 1, that are produced by statistical tests
(like the linear regression used here). A smaller p value indicates that the observed result is less
likely to be due to chance. That is, the p value is a description of how likely it is to find the current
result were the null hypothesis proven to be true. Commonly accepted thresholds for p values in
the social sciences are p<0.05, p<0.01, and p<0.001 with smaller p values being considered more
rigorous. Sufficiently small p values are said to be statistically significant.
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processing times.123 For the model using all case data (Model 1), all of
these disposition outcomes were highly significant (p<0.00), but in the
homicide-only model (Model 2), only pleading guilty (p<0.019) and
finding a verdict of guilty (p<0.021) significantly varied from the
comparison group.
The models also revealed that there are important relationships
between demographics and felony case processing times. In Model 1,
women appeared to have significant shorter case processing times than
men (p<0.00). Age also had a strong negative relationship with felony
case processing times. Race and ethnicity also significantly varied from
the white reference group in Model 1. Compared to white defendants,
Black defendants had significantly shorter case-processing times
(p<0.00), while Hispanic and Asian defendants had significantly longer
case-processing times (p<0.00). We run an additional set of models in
Figure 6 to make meaning of this distinct finding, this time estimating a
logistic regression model with a binary outcome variable for whether or
not a defendant ultimately pled guilty.
Figure 6: Predicting Guilty Pleas
Model 3
Model 4
All Cases
Homicide Cases Only
(b/se)

(b/se)

0.090***

-0.800**

(0.02)

(0.26)

0.197***

-0.456

(0.02)

(0.29)

-0.573***

-0.051

(0.08)

(1.45)

0.165

1.235

(0.15)

(1.18)

0.078***

0.487*

(0.02)

(0.22)

Race
Black

Hispanic

Asian

Other

Female

Other

-0.434

123. Klemm, supra note 76, at 17.
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(1.00)

Age

Constant

-0.001**

0.003

(0.00)

(0.01)

0.343***

-0.255

(0.03)

(0.32)

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Model 3 reveals important variation by race and gender that may help
explain some of the differences in case-processing times in found in
Model 1. Model 3 shows that Black, Hispanic, and female defendants
were significantly more likely to plead guilty (p<0.00), perhaps
suggesting that some defendants are more likely to take plea deals that
end their cases early. This explanation does not, however, neatly explain
the coefficient switch for Hispanic defendants between Models 1 and 3.
Differing utilization of plea deals would be consistent with the findings
for the homicide-only Model 4, since a more severe offense is less likely
to carry an attractive plea deal.
Taken in sum, the Level 1 trend data provide several key insights about
felony case-processing times. First, they prove that case-processing times
have continued to increase, even as the number of dispositions has
decreased. This trend appears to have spiked to new levels during the
COVID-19 pandemic. Second, they confirm that differing dispositional
outcomes have significant effects on felony case-processing times. Third,
they show that there are substantial differences by demographic group for
both case-processing times and likelihood of entering a guilty plea. What
these data do not tell us is what is making case-processing times longer.
We are able to ascertain the endpoints, but not any of the steps that come
between them. To gain a clearer understanding of what might extend
case-processing times, we move to the next level of data using the SingleProceeding Observations in Level 2.
C. Single-Proceeding Observations Results
The data explored in Level 2 add nuance to the Level 1 data's inbetween spaces . These data consist of single-proceeding observations,
demonstrating what decisions were being made at the time of
observation. We know what the larger system outcomes are from the
Level 1 data, but the Level 2 data illuminate how we arrived there.
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Figure 7 below plots the types of proceedings identified among the
1,166 observed cases. In order of known types, the most common
proceeding types were administrative status checks (53.26%), guilty
pleas (6.09%), and arraignments (5.57%). A much smaller number of
cases were observed to be sentencings, jury selection, or multiple types
of proceedings. Notably, a substantial number of cases fell into the
category “other” or “unknown.” These data demonstrate that consistent
with previous work, a majority of cases heard were administrative status
checks.
Figure 7: Single-Proceeding Types
Frequency

Percent

Status

621

53.26

Other

178

15.27

Unknown

77

6.6

Guilty Plea

71

6.09

Arraignment

65

5.57

Bench Trial

42

3.6

Jury Trial

39

3.34

Multiple

36

3.09

Sentencing

29

2.49

Jury Selection

8

0.69

Total

1,166

Of the 1,166 cases observed, 273 (23.41%) were delayed in starting
their proceedings. These delays varied in their cause and duration, but
nevertheless it is significant to note that delays before beginning to hear
an individual case were not uncommon. In an analysis of 578 of the
administrative status checks, we concluded that the median time spent
before a judge was around two minutes.124
124. Some cases could not be tabulated because the observer entered the courtroom when the
case was already in progress or left before it was completed. Cases that spent less than one minute
in front of a judge were calculated at 0 to differentiate them from the substantial pool that spent one
minute before a judge. We offer a median value here in an attempt to lessen the impact of these
methodological choices.
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The observers also made careful notes about the role of continuances
for each case. Continuances were common, observed in 315 of the coded
cases. Figure 8 below details which party requested a continuance. The
most frequent requestor of continuances was the defense alone (31.95%
of requested continuances), though the State and the defense together
requested continuances frequently (27.48% of requested continuances),
and the State alone requested a continuance in 13.74% of requested
continuances. The court itself often requested continuances as well
(24.28% of requested continuances). This suggests that the proliferation
of continuances cannot be properly attributed to only one court actor;
rather, it is a strategy used by all involved parties.
Figure 8: Continuance Requests by Party
Frequency

Percent

Defense

100

31.95

State and Defense

86

27.48

Court

76

24.28

State

43

13.74

Other, Multiple

5

1.6

Other, Unknown

3

0.96

Total

313

Objections to continuances were rare; it only happened eleven times
(3.51% of the time). Similarly, judges were very unlikely to deny
continuances. Denial was noted by the observers only twice (0.64% of
the time). In twenty-two cases (7.01% of the time), the judge did attach
some limitations or a warning to the continuance.
These data from Level 2 illustrates some important things about actual
sources of delay that combine to constitute the macro trends we observed
in Level 1. Level 2 data demonstrate that status checks are the most
frequent type of court business (among the observed cases) and that
delays in beginning a proceeding and continuances to delay resolving a
proceeding are both very common. Furthermore, we can conclude that
delays are not a strategy exclusively used by one party. Rather they are
used by all actors in the courtroom, are rarely objected to, and are more
rarely denied. We now proceed to our final level of analysis, moving from
macro-level trends to illuminating what is actually happening in
proceedings through qualitative data that describes the context in which
these delays occur.
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D. Ethnographic Observations Results
The Level 3 ethnographic data reflect observations and interpretations
of specific interactions in the courtroom. The quotations presented here
are transcribed exactly as they were heard in court, redacted only to
protect the privacy of individuals named within the observation. In
thematically coding these field notes, we identified three categories that
typified observations about case-processing delays: 1) differentiating
types of delays, 2) a lack of immediate remedies other than delays, and
3) delays as an unremarkable feature of court business.
1. Cases Experience Different Types of Delays
The ethnographic field notes made it clear that there were
differentiable sources of delay in case processing, some more intrinsically
harmful than others. One kind of delay was not necessarily harmful, as it
might relate to the time necessary to prepare a thorough case. This was
particularly relevant for cases requiring forensic evidence or additional
discovery. In one such case, the observer wrote that
The state’s attorney tells Judge that discovery is not finished in this case
and they are still working on grand jury scheduling. He also says he
does not know the status of the case other than that they are waiting on
DNA discovery and “for the case to work its way through the felony
court system.”125

Here we see a scenario closest to what was described by Flemming et
al. as sufficient time and considerations needed to fully pursue justice.126
Of course, this does not guarantee that this delay was unavoidable, but it
is reasonably plausible that in some cases, factors outside the control of
court actors might justify such a delay.
A second type of case-processing delay from the observational data
was inherently harmful to the lifecycle of the case. These delays often
completely derailed a case, causing the case to be significantly delayed
in being heard or rescheduled altogether. In one such instance, the court
observer recorded the presiding judge’s thoughts on the delay. The judge
said,
It appears that today he was sent to IDOC. I don’t know why they would
do that when they knew he was due to appear in court this morning so

125. Amy Smekar, Cook County Criminal Division Courtroom Observance 96 (Nov. 6, 2018)
(unpublished research notes) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Ethnographic Observations]. Names
and other identifying information has been excluded for anonymity and readability.
126. See Flemming, Nardulli & Eisenstein, supra note 62, at 179–80 (“[C]ontemporary criminal
procedures molded by the ‘due process revolution’ of the 60s do not rest on this goal [of swift
justice]. Judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys . . . are not single-mindedly devoted to disposing of cases as quickly as possible. ‘Doing justice’ holds importance for them and takes time to
produce . . . .”).
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the defendant is not in court. . . . So, that will delay disposition in this
case by a month. Beats me why they did that.127

Here an error by custodial authorities prevented the court from
proceeding, not just for that day, but an entire month. Other justice
professionals also precipitated significant delays. One judge was
particularly irritated by two absent law-enforcement officers. The
courtroom observer described the situation as follows:
State’s Attorney tells Judge that the two police officers‚whom the court
subpoenaed to give testimony today, are not coming.
“Officer told me that his unit was excused.”
“Who told him that? Anyone besides me or another judge cannot excuse
officers from a subpoena. Who’s the officer? Who’s the other officer?
Okay, I’m issuing a warrant. I want to know who excused them!” 128

This is another instance of delays outside the control of the court that
had great potential to impact the proceedings. The judge in this instance
proceeded to ask if the parties had reached a plea deal.
The third type of delay identified in this analysis involved scheduling.
These scheduling delays took two forms: those that delayed the present
docket,129 and scheduling delays choosing a date for the next step in the
case. The observer detailed one example of the latter decision below:
Judge is not pleased. [The judge said,] “This case is from 2016, and it
sounds like I set this [trial] date long before your schedules filled. So,
why can’t we do October 1, 2018 [for the trial]? And I usually try to do
final pretrial conferences at least three weeks before the trial.” 130

This interaction makes meaning of the volume of continuances viewed
in the Level 2 data. Here, the judge commented that the trial date had
been long set, so he wanted to know why that date would not continue to
stand.
2. Court Actors Lack Contemporaneous Remedies
The ethnographic data also revealed a lack of quick remedies available
to judges and other court actors to deal with delays. In one case, a judge
and a state’s attorney were discussing what to do about a lawyer they
could not reach. The state’s attorney could not reach the defense attorney,
who was not present. The opposing legal team was not returning his calls.
The judge and state’s attorney speculated as to why, with the state’s
attorney theorizing that it was a high-budget operation, but that the
secretary was putting him off.131
127. Ethnographic Observations, supra note 125, at 156.
128. Id. at 171.
129. In one instance the court (and all its observers) waited fifty minutes for an attorney to
appear for a two-minute status check and date selection. Id. at 159.
130. Id. at 167.
131. Id. at 39.
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Despite their theorizing, neither the state’s attorney nor the judge
seemed to have an obvious way of contemporaneously prompting contact
from the attorney. Even if a remedy existed to compel absent attorneys to
appear after a given court session, judges were frequently unable to act in
the moment—because any such action would incorrectly harm the
defendant. The ethnographic observer detailed one such situation below,
with timestamps.
11:42–12:07: The court waits for private defense attorney to arrive.
According to Judge she was “on her way two hours ago.” He is
annoyed. The women leave the gallery to wait in the hallway.
12:01: Judge calls [the defendant] out, although [the defense attorney]
has yet to arrive. He explains that the court has waited a significant
amount of time for her and the rest of the call for the day is done.
Judge also notes that this is the “third time” [the attorney] has extended
the timetable she has to file her pretrial motions. He moves [the case]
to Friday, when “She must file all pretrial motions. That is the last day
before trial.”132

This pattern of delay from the attorney posed a problem for the judge.
The defendant, of course, had nothing to do with it but would have been
tangibly harmed if the judge had taken contemporaneous action against
the attorney. Therefore, the judge opted to move the proceedings back.
This is a common resolution in these cases, though the judge does
sometimes admonish the defendant for their attorney’s absence or request
that the defendant relay a message to their attorney.
3. Delays Are Business as Usual
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, was the observation that delays
are not noteworthy in court and are instead completely ordinary. Most of
the time, there was no noteworthy interaction when either party would
request a continuance, schedule a status check, or even start slightly
delayed. This happened so frequently that it was routine. Even when
some other form of delay occurred, the procedure of status check and new
court date was referred to as the inevitable outcome anyway. The
observer described one such situation below:
[T]he Latino man from the front of the gallery approaches the bench
without his lawyer. Judge does not chastise him for his lawyer’s
absence. Instead the Judge implies there wasn’t much to be done to
today’s status update on [defendant’s] case anyway and gives him a new
court date of November 1, 2018.133

The lack of progress on the case was not due to the lawyer’s absence,
rather it was the expected result had the lawyer been present. In this
132. Id. at 180–81.
133. Id. at 225.
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particular instance, as happened occasionally, we see that the lawyer’s
presence was not even necessary to schedule the next status update. It
was also clear from various interactions between the judge, the defense,
and the State that delays were liberally taken and par for the course. In
one observation the extent of delays became clear as the observer noted,
Judge tells the state’s attorney and the defense counsel that they must
be prepared at the next court date. “I believe both sides have received
their allotment of delays,” he says. The private defense attorney pipes
up, “Your honor, I think I’ve been on time every time, but I respect
that.” Judge has his records ready. He gives the dates and circumstance
of the two separate times that the defense delayed proceedings or did
not have the required documents and materials ready. The defense
attorney flushes and acknowledges both instances. [The state’s
attorney] looks satisfied.134

In this case, both sides used all delays available to them. The judge
even referred to the delays as “allotted” rather than as a remedy for an
unforeseen circumstance. Consistent with our findings from data in Level
2, both sides appeared to have made use of delays.
The ethnographic data in Level 3 provide something that the other
levels of data do not: contextual richness that details how specific
interactions reflect patterns of behavior and consistent functioning in the
courtroom. In Part V of this Article, we weave all three levels of data
together, before analyzing the workings and consequences of a pathdependent court.
V. DELAY AS A SYSTEM
Much like the system of delays we seek to describe, the data
undergirding this analysis are multifaceted and complicated. We chose to
include three types of data because all three are necessary to measure
system outcome, diagnose system action, and elaborate on the context of
those actions. In the section to follow, we make meaning of that data as a
whole before turning to the theoretical question of path dependency and
the locked-in state of felony case-processing delays.
A. Synthesizing the Data
The data in this study confirm and extend previous work on felony
case-processing delays. Consistent with other work, this study concludes
that dispositional outcomes predict case-processing times, with guilty
pleas logically exiting the system early on average.135 This study also
reveals that Cook County felony case-processing times are substantially
higher than averages found in other courts, where, even before the onset
134. Id. at 172.
135. Klemm, supra note 76, at 9.
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of COVID-19, the average time from arrest to disposition in Cook County
was 373.51 days.136 Further, statistical analysis demonstrates that
members of different demographic groups experience case-processing
times differently, which necessitates additional research and protections.
This study considers the building blocks of court delay that create these
larger patterns. This next level of data reveals that status checks comprise
a majority of court cases and that continuances are common. Previous
research postulated that it may be advantageous for the defense to delay
cases,137 but this analysis found that court actors in all roles made use of
continuances with rare objection and even rarer denial.
Finally, this study steps into the daily context of Cook County criminal
courts via ethnographic field notes that translate the lived experience of
court actors navigating this system of delays. It is at this level where we
begin to discern a system of expected delays. In short, we find that types
of case delays are highly variable, but that status checks and continuances
are part of the daily expectation and machinations of the courts at 26th
and California.
B. Path Dependency in Cook County Criminal Court
Earlier in this work, we asked whether the path-dependency theory
might usefully characterize the current state of Cook County courts as
locked into an equilibrium state where delays are inevitable. Here we
revisit and attempt to answer that question.
We left our consideration of path dependency as a useful descriptor of
Cook County with a series of hypotheticals postulating parallels between
Schreyögg and Sydow’s definition of path dependency and plausible
functions of felony case processing.138 Armed with the data and results
from Part IV, we can replace those hypotheticals with known evidence
from 26th and California.
We begin by reconsidering if dispositional outcomes are affected by
what comes before them in sequence. The findings of this study support
this assertion, demonstrating at multiple levels of data analysis how
scheduling challenges, continuances, status checks, and delays due to
factors external to the control of the defendant prolong cases. There is
also significant support for the assertion that decisions by stakeholders
affect or limit what choices remain. Take, for example, the results from
the Level 2 analysis of continuances, demonstrating that stakeholders
from both sides make decisions that necessarily determine the next step
136. See, e.g., Ostrom et al., supra note 61, at 746 (showing that felony case dispositions in
Colorado ranged from approximately 150 days to 315 day).
137. Frase, supra note 66, at 668.
138. See Schreyögg & Sydow, supra note 108, at 4–5; see also discussion infra Part III (discussing Schreyögg and Sydow’s work on path dependency).
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in sequence.
We return, then, to the most important question: whether the sequence
of decision-making may become so entrenched and so reified that it
creates a locked-in path that is impossible to deviate from without
intervention. The data presented here suggests this is the case in the courts
at 26th and California.
Moving in reverse, we can start from Level 3, where we see individual
case decisions that seem to have no remedy other than delay. Whether
due to missing court actors, schedules so full of other matters that they
become intractable, or the inability to provide any contemporaneous
sanction or remedy, we see an entrenched system of delays that
necessarily compound upon each other. Even when the system is not in a
state of duress, status checks with little substantive progress are an
expectation, not an aberration. We then move up to Level 2, where we
see this system of delays not operating in one case, but in over a thousand.
Again, delays, continuances, and status checks are the most common and
present features necessarily leading to more of the same. Notably, these
continuances are an accepted part of the process. They are rarely objected
to and almost never denied, even as we see them frustrating judges in the
contextual data only one level below. We then move upwards to the final
level, seeking evidence that these patterns of decision and delay at the
lower level constitute an intractable force. And we find that evidence in
the form of heightened case-processing times, most predictably lessened
by off-ramps like guilty pleas rather than an efficient process.
This leaves us with a deeply intertwined system of delays that is no
longer being propelled forward by individual decisions, but rather by
system-wide expectations. When cases come before the judge, no one
expects the case to move further along substantively. Instead, that day’s
court business will be finding another date to return to court. This
necessarily pushes cases down the road, as yesterday’s continuances
become today’s problems. In this way, theories of path dependency are
strikingly apt, as the court system struggles to balance its caseload while
seeking interventions designed to shock the system into efficiency.
VI. THE COMPLEXITY OF INTERVENTION
On January 27, 2022, Chief Judge Timothy Evans announced one such
intervention: Cook County would adopt a differentiated casemanagement system across the entire Criminal Division.139 This system
139. See Press Release, Circuit Ct. of Cook Cnty., Chief Judge Timothy Evans Meets with Representatives of Retail Groups to Discuss Facts and Solutions About Retail Theft Problem (Apr. 4,
2022),
https://www.cookcountycourt.org/MEDIA/View-Press-Release/ArticleId/2924/ChiefJudge-Timothy-C-Evans-meets-with-representatives-of-retail-groups-to-discuss-facts-and-
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separates felony cases into four tracks for disposition between six months
and two years, depending on severity. The trial court then enters a Case
Management Order (CMO) setting out deadlines to accomplish essential
tasks such as discovery production.140 The reform could provide a
framework for reducing delay, although, as we argue in this Part, the
success of this initiative will depend on acknowledging the perspectives
and interests of all the courtroom actors, as outlined below.
A. Case Management Orders and Administrative Status Checks
The CMO is intended to control the lifecycle of a case as it moves
through the court system. It is a court order that set dates for discovery,
pretrial motions, and the trial. Each CMO contains blank lines that require
parties to write (and agree to) a schedule for important case-processing
steps. This document is then distributed to the parties and held by the
court and used to hold counsel accountable as the case unfolds.
Proponents of CMOs point to them as effective tools.141 Scholars have
observed, however, that CMOs are neither an end unto themselves nor
foolproof solutions. For example, Cabraser noted that a CMO cannot
merely exist; it must be customized, fair, economical, and efficient,
requiring investment from the system to ensure it is viable.142 These
customized CMOs therefore require counsel to invest time and effort in
determining reasonable deadlines.143 As some scholars have also noted,
solutions-about-theft-problem [https://perma.cc/LW88-LQG2] (noting earlier announcement of
differentiated case-management system). Chief Judge Evans also endorsed an application of deterrence theory in this strategy, asserting that consistency of punishment will deter crime more effectively than severity. Olivia Olander, Cook County’s Top Judge Discusses Chicago Violence, Proposes Solutions in Policy Address, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 27, 2022), https://www.
chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-chief-judge-timothy-evans-policy-address-20220128-6eq
xqa3xenbzfi73ndoinxmt5i-story.html [https://perma.cc/JXE3-6KY2].
140. A pilot project had been in place since 2010. General Administrative Order 10-3, Implementation of an Active Case Management Program for Trial Judges (Aug. 20, 2010),
https://www.cookcountycourt.org/Portals/0/Law%20Divison/General%20Administrative%20Orders/Law%20-%20General%20Administrative%20Order10-3.PDF
[https://perma.cc/ZAP9VL7J]. The Cook County CMO form was originally designed by 1st Subcircuit Judge Thaddeus
Wilson. Practically speaking, the way this document moves through the system is as follows: the
clerk gives copies of the CMO to the state, to the defense counsel, and to defendant. When asked
about the CMOs during the ethnographic observations, Judge Wilson indicated that he believed
CMOs helped keep attorneys accountable to the dates set. While it is impossible to infer causality
from this data, at the time of the Ethnographic Observations, Judge Wilson had one of the lowest
pending caseloads in the building. Ethnographic Observations, supra note 125, at 163.
141. See, e.g., Scott A. Steiner, The Case Management Order: Use and Efficacy in Complex
Litigation and the Toxic Tort, 6 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENV’T L. & POL’Y 71, 72 (1999) (focusing
on judicial economy to justify a “detailed, extensive, and thorough” CMO); Elizabeth Joan
Cabraser, How to Streamline Complex Litigation, THE BRIEF, Summer 1992, at 13, 13 (“Case management orders force counsel to focus on the essentials of their claims and defenses, abandon collateral issues, limit and target their discovery, and simplify the presentation of their positions . . .
.”).
142. Cabraser, supra note 141, at 13.
143. See Steiner, supra note 141, at 73.
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inflexible case-management procedures can actually encourage inefficiency and delay.144 Proponents do not deny that CMOs may be burdensome but argue that the benefits of CMOs outweigh problems associated
with them.145 We see similar promise for CMOs, but only if their implementation integrates the perspectives of the different legal actors. As this
Article argues, delay forms an essential part of Cook County case processing. The mechanisms and rhythms of delay have become integral of
local court culture, to settled expectations of how a case should progress.146 Because CMOs disrupt this culture—something we see as desirable—it can succeed only by recognizing these settled expectations in
implementing this intervention. Examples of these expectations follow.
B. Legal Actors’ Positionality with Respect to Case-Processing Delays
1. The Prosecutors’ Uneven Control
Cook County prosecutors enjoy remarkable power in controlling the
pace of adjudication, while at the same time, their work is also hamstrung
by police, at least in the Chicago police.
In Cook County, prosecutors, not judges, control daily court calls and
the scheduling of cases to be heard for status and for trial. Because
prosecutors’ preparedness for adjudication often depends on ongoing
police investigation, trial courts in Cook County have by and large ceded
control of the pace of adjudication to them. Prosecutors determine which
cases are ready for trial and which cases must be delayed because of
missing documentation or unavailable witnesses. Prosecutors also keep
track of the “speedy trial clock” for each case. In most, if not all,
courtrooms, judges may question the prosecutor’s progress in readying a
case for trial, but such questioning is most often confined to cases in
which delay is extraordinary. In Cook County prosecutors exert more
control over court calls than judges, which varies from consensus best
practices supported by case management scholars in assigning this
144. Michael E. Tigar, Pretrial Case Management Under the Amended Rules: Too Many Words
for a Good Idea, 14 REV. LITIG. 137, 154–55 (1994). Indeed, a cursory analysis of the Cook County
data suggests that CMOs are not necessarily a silver bullet for improving case processing. We allocated nineteen hours and forty-one minutes of observational data across their respective six
judges and recorded how often cases were scheduled for status checks in thirty days or less, in more
than thirty days, or if no status check was scheduled, comparing the results of the judge who used
CMOs with those of the judges who did not. This analysis, while cursory and limited by the available data, did not suggest any dramatic difference in the number of status conferences as between
the courtrooms that used the CMO and those that did not. This underscores our overall contention
that CMOs can work only with significant buy-in from the lawyers.
145. See Steiner, supra note 141, at 73 (briefly describing arguments against CMOs, but finding
benefits outweigh criticisms).
146. For a discussion of organizational culture, courts, and mistakes, see generally Maria Hawilo et al., How Culture Impacts Courtrooms: An Empirical Study of Alienation and Detachment in
the Cook County Court System, 112 J. CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST. 171 (2022).
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control predominantly to judges.147
However, transmission of police reports to the Cook County State’s
Attorney’s Office (CCSAO) is a process fraught with delay and error.148
In responding to courts’ request for information about the status of
discovery, prosecutors are often heard to say that there has been a delay
in the receipt of police reports. When sets of police reports are finally
received by the CCSAO, those sets are often incomplete. Even when
subpoenaed for documents, the Chicago Police Department fails to
respond or returns unresponsive or incomplete information. This
complicates the previously documented problem the prosecution and
defense have in coordinating their efforts to resolve a case.149
2. The Public Defenders’ Institutional Weaknesses
The Law Office of the Cook County Public Defender represents four
of five individuals accused of crime in the Criminal Division of the
Circuit Court of Cook County.150 The Office was founded in 1930 as part
of efforts to address the influence of a corrupt private defense bar, well
before the Supreme Court made appointment of counsel to indigent
criminal defendants a constitutional right.151 Until recently, the office was
plagued by political influence, patronage hiring, and control by the

147. Numerous, books, articles, and reports have described the Cook County Prosecutor’s role
in Cook County’s criminal courts. See, e.g., GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, supra note 18, at 127–55
(identifying the prosecutor’s control in the courtroom within context of discussing culture of racialized justice in Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office). There is a consensus among those who
study case management that the judges and not any particular party to proceedings should control
case flow. For example, the American Bar Association Prosecution Function Standards provide:
“Final control over the scheduling of court appearances, hearings, and trials in criminal matters
should rest with the court rather than the parties.” CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION
FUNCTION § 3-6.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017). Additionally, the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice
Special Function of the Trial Judge require judges to use court time effectively. SPECIAL
FUNCTIONS OF THE TRIAL JUDGE § 6-1.5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2000). See also MAUREEN SOLOMON,
CONDUCTING A FELONY CASEFLOW MANAGEMENT REVIEW: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 3 (2010),
https://bja.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh186/files/Publications/AU_FelonyCaseflow.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JNG4-B4PT] (stressing need for judicial leadership).
148. See Staudt, supra note 25 (“It is common for attorneys to wait 4–6 months to receive basic
police reports, videos, and recordings that constitute the bare bones of cases at trial.”).
149. See id. (noting problem of delay caused by police failure to appear or produce documents).
This problem was also noted in Chicago Appleseed’s 2007 report on Cook County’s Felony Courts.
CHI. APPLESEED FUND FOR JUST., supra note 19, at 75.
150. See Josh McGhee, Lack of Statewide Oversight Has Led to Excessive Caseloads for Illinois
Public Defenders, Study Says, INJUSTICE WATCH (June 10, 2021), https://www.injusticewatch.org/news/2021/illinois-public-defenders-oversight/ [https://perma.cc/7WZ4-REZ2].
151. See ILL. ASS’N FOR CRIM. JUST., supra note 19, at 410 (recommending that a public-defender system be established to eliminate corrupt practices of then-existing criminal-defense bar);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963) (requiring states to provide defense counsel
at public expense to indigent clients).
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leadership of the Circuit Court of Cook County.152 While the Defender
continues to improve, its progress is hindered by a crushing caseload out
of step with national standards, inadequate resources to track and manage
that caseload, antiquated hiring practices that reduce their
competitiveness for the best new law graduates, and problematic work
assignments. This last point is a structural issue. Assistant public
defenders are assigned to courtrooms and not clients.153 As a result, these
assistant public defenders, while representing individual clients, are also
necessarily part of courtroom work groups that are beholden to the
control of prosecutors and judges, and ultimately to court administrators
and county boards. Participating in and being beholden to these
workgroups compromises the assistant public defenders’ ability to
provide zealous representation to their clients, including by demanding
that their clients receive speedy trials. Unless assistant public defenders
feel free to demand trial, there will be no speedy trial in Cook County’s
criminal courts.154
These lawyers also recognize that delay can sometimes help their own
clients, so negotiation of the terms of the CMO needs to carefully balance
these realities. It is well-understood that delay can help defendants in their
cases. Witnesses’ memories may fade; the witness may lose interest or
become unavailable to testify against the defendant.155 A court can
legitimately press on with resolution in the face of this possible
gamesmanship. A nuanced concern, however, warrants attention. With
time, tempers can cool. Defendants can change, grow up. Other cases
may put this defendant’s offense into greater perspective. Sometimes
justice is in fact served by some delay.
3. The Economics of the Private Defense Practice
Private criminal defense lawyers depend on fees from their clients. For
many, their practices are economically viable only as a volume business.
Their clients’ cases will be assigned to the various courtrooms at 26th and
California and to the outlying criminal courts in Cook County (Markham,
152. See CHI. APPLESEED FUND FOR JUST., supra note 19, at 34–62 (documenting history of
Cook County Public Defender, noting history of political influence on Office, its lack of independence caused by influence of Circuit Court and County Board); see also SIXTH AMEND. CTR., THE
RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN ILLINOIS 41–45 (2021) (documenting challenges faced by Cook County
Public Defender). See generally GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, supra note 147.
153. See SIXTH AMEND. CTR., supra note 152, at 116 (generally noting lack of an independent
body to control public defense in Illinois).
154. Id. at 155–56.
155. William Glaberson, Faltering Courts, Mired in Delays, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/14/nyregion/justice-denied-bronx-court-system-mired-in-delays.html [https://perma.cc/QJ9B-PLWC] (“Defense lawyers everywhere use delay to foster doubt.
They capitalize on memories that grow murky and the holes that are blown in cases when prosecution witnesses go missing.”).
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Rolling Meadows, Skokie, Maybrook). On any given day, all cases
scheduled to be heard in the various courtrooms in Cook County are
scheduled to be heard at the same time—normally 9:30 in the morning.
The courts do not schedule court calls at different times, so private
attorneys end up with multiple cases scheduled to be heard at the same
time. These lawyers must move quickly from courtroom to courtroom,
juggling the different hearing times. When lawyers do not appear when
their cases are called, the cases must be “passed” while the client, judge,
and/or prosecutor attempt to locate the attorney to determine an estimated
arrival time. This inconveniences everyone in the courtroom, lengthens
court calls, and may result in the postponement of a status to a later date,
contributing to the perpetuation of a system characterized by repeated
delay.
Historically private counsel have had no reliable means to
communicate with judges and prosecutors to alert them to a scheduling
conflict. One development occasioned by the COVID-19 pandemic is
promising, namely the increased availability of e-mail messaging. Technical solutions for alerting court and counsel, and indeed, for avoiding
scheduling conflicts altogether, would enable all to use court time more
efficiently, as would reducing the number of status conferences.
4. The Independence of Individual Circuit Court Judges
The chief judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County is elected by the
full Circuit Court judges. While the chief judge by rule has the authority
to assign and to remove judges, in practice the chief judge is constrained
by political considerations from exercising control except under the most
notorious circumstances, most commonly when a judge engages in offensive behavior that catches the public eye.156 Historically, chief judges of
the Circuit Court of Cook County have been unable or unwilling to insist
upon fair and efficient management of court calls, leaving judges in their
assignments whose decisions have been repeatedly reversed by Illinois
appellate courts.157 This lack of control at the top has created a culture of
156. See, e.g., Mark Brown, Not the First Time ‘Lock ’Em Up Judge’ Showed Questionable
Judgment, CHI. SUN-TIMES (Mar. 6, 2020, 4:55 PM), https://chicago.suntimes.com/opinion/2020/3/6/21168544/jackie-portman-brown-cook-county-courts-judicial-conduct
[https://perma.cc/NQ6L-XVLU] (discussing discipline faced by a Cook County Circuit Court
Judge who locked a child in her courtroom holding cell).
157. See John Seasly, 4 Judges, 6 Years, 98 Reversals—and They Want You to Vote to Keep
Them in Office, INJUSTICE WATCH (Oct. 11, 2020), https://www.injusticewatch.org/news/judicialelections/2020/4-judges-98-reversals/ [https://perma.cc/UB5S-XEN9] (discussing four Cook
County Circuit Court judges whose ruling have frequently been reversed by appellate courts); see
also John Seasly, Appeals Court Reverses This Judge More than Any Other in Criminal Courts
Seeking Retention, INJUSTICE WATCH (Oct. 11, 2020), https://www.injusticewatch.org/news/judicial-elections/2020/kenneth-wadas-reversals/ [https://perma.cc/2HMJ-WKBP] (discussing Cook
County Circuit Court judge with most frequent reversals); Emily Hoerner & Casey Toner, Meet the
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impunity that allows judges to control their courts as jurisdictions functionally independent of any supervisory authority. There is no monitoring
of each judge’s conduct in the courtroom, including the timing of daily
court calls, the number of hearings and trials, and treatment of the courtroom working group and the public who attend court. The chief judge
shelters judges from public scrutiny by refusing to release what should be
publicly available statistics regarding their caseloads, disposition rates,
time spent on the bench, and sentencing practices.158
VII. CONCLUSION
The data analyzed here and the weight of the literature make clear that
administrative status checks are a principal source of delay in felony case
processing in Cook County. While the status checks themselves are short,
they dominate court time. They require corralling many people into the
courtroom for long periods of idle time. They contribute to the backlog
of cases. Court time is given over to rote tasks as substantive hearings
become the exception.
At the same time, lawyers used status checks, at least prior to the
COVID-19 pandemic, to speak about the case with each other, with defendants, and sometimes the judge. Often, the CCSAO requires discovery
to be exchanged in person at status hearings. These multiple functions of
the status conference suggests that justice would not be served simply by
reducing the number of status checks. Instead, court culture should promote alternative venues for these important contacts. Indeed, as COVID19 precautions reduced attorneys’ ability to meet personally, lawyers
have been exchanging information electronically to an extent unheard of
prior to the pandemic.
This Article analyzes the system of felony case-processing delays in
Cook County criminal courts using a novel combination of three data
sources that help visualize the ramifications of delay at multiple levels.
Those data combine to demonstrate that felony case processing times are
high, that administrative status checks dominate daily dockets, and that
continuances and delays are common. Further, these data demonstrate
that continuances are used by all court actors, just not one side, and that
there is a dearth of contemporaneous remedies available to avoid delays
on the day an issue is heard. Taken in sum, this paper argues that the
current state of felony case processing in Cook County is one where status
checks, continuances, and delays are not delays at all—instead they are
Cook County Judge Attorneys Least Want to Appear Before, INJUSTICE WATCH (Oct. 22, 2020),
https://www.injusticewatch.org/news/2020/the-circuit-diane-cannon-soj/ [https://perma.cc/G9QAZUZC] (discussing some attorneys’ negative impressions of a Cook County Circuit Court judge).
158. See Staudt, supra note 25 (showing how data can illuminate issues with case-processing
times and suggesting all court actors bear responsibility for improving situation).
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ordinary daily occurrences that typify and perpetuate the process and the
culture of justice in the criminal courtrooms at 26th and California. In this
way, the courts find themselves locked-in to a path-dependent system in
which status checks and continuances are an immutable feature of the
system. The sum of these analyses leads us to advocate for a lessening of
administrative status checks and judicial leadership in the management
of case-flow management according to national standards. It also requires
a court culture that recognizes the responsibility of each individual courtsystem actor in creating delay, and the will to collaborate to enact the
necessary change.
Judges, prosecutors, and defenders act independently of one another,
despite an interrelated system of dependent pathways. Intractable delay
will not be addressed without first, acknowledging the appropriate role
for each system actor, and second, creating collaboration to reduce delay
among system actors. The chief judge must promote a culture in which
Cook County Circuit Court judges and associate judges assert control of
their courtrooms. Judges then must work with assistant state’s attorneys
and public defenders to ensure that judges manage and dictate schedules
in the courtrooms. Assistant state’s attorneys and police officers should
work together to receive and provide discovery material to which the accused is entitled. And defenders and assistant state’s attorneys should
communicate about discovery and related matters electronically or before
court hearings. Court hearings should be reserved for substantive arguments, not informal information gathering. These are neither easy nor
quick fixes, but the rewards would be significant.

